Internal migration and public policy by Giuranno, Michele G. & Rongili, Biswas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Internal migration and public policy
Michele G. Giuranno and Biswas Rongili
University of Salento (Italy), Maulana Azad College (India)
29 October 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94217/
MPRA Paper No. 94217, posted 31 May 2019 09:13 UTC
Internal migration and public
policy
Michele G. Giurannoyand Rongili Biswasz
May 23, 2019
Abstract
This paper studies the relation between internal migration
and public spending on public goods. We describe centralized
public policy when a central government is comprised of elected
representatives from local electoral districts. Internal migration
determines the median voter in the districts. The median vot-
ers decide the equilibrium policy through bargaining. We nd
the conditions under which votersmobility results in larger or
smaller public spending. Furthermore, the distance between the
actual size and the e¢ cient size of government spending depends
on the way internal migration changes the distribution of income
within and between districts.
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1 Introduction
It is commonly proposed that immigrants who acquire the right to vote
lead to either a smaller or larger public spending depending on whether
it regards skilled or unskilled workers respectively.1 The literature has
mainly focused on external migration. This paper studies the case of
internal migration ows.
The role of internal migration in population redistribution has been
observed in a large number of countries (Rees et al., 2017; Bell et al.
2018), such as in the cases of the relocation of citizens in Latin American
cities (Rodríguez-Vignoli and Rowe, 2018; Stillwell et al., 2018), after
the reunication in Germany or after the second world war between the
South and the North of Italy. In the European Union, workersrelocation
is often viewed as a¤ecting national and European economic policies.2
Given the empirical relevance of internal migration, this paper de-
velops a theoretical framework which will be able to identify the impli-
cations of internal migration on a countrys policy formation. This is an
issue conspicuously absent in public economics literature. In order to do
so, we develop a model on central governments public spending on pub-
lic goods. The equilibrium policy outcome is a compromise between the
conict of interests of the median voters of the local jurisdictions that
comprise a state. The geographical distribution of voters determines
the median voter and elected representatives of the constituencies of the
central government. Therefore, inter-jurisdictional migration changes
the identity of the pivotal voters in local constituencies.
In this paper we consider political institutions in which policy de-
cisions are made through bargaining by locally elected representatives
in the central legislature. When migration changes the "local" median
voters and, accordingly, the locally elected representatives, policies also
change at the central level.
After migrating, individual incomes may change (Korpi and Clark,
2015). Therefore, inter-jurisdictional mobility can a¤ect the distribution
of income3 within and among jurisdictions and the average income of the
whole economy.4 In particular, incomes of jurisdictional median voters
1See Cohen, Razin, and Sadka (2009), Razin, Sadka and Benjaron (2011) and
many others.
2See, among the others, De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009), Kvist (2004) and Skupnik
(2013), Yazgia (2014).
3For a recent discussion of the relation between income distribution and the design
of public policies see Arachi, Giuranno, and Profeta (2018).
4Note that mobility can a¤ect the distribution of income even if individual in-
comes do not change after migration because the rank of the migrating individual
in the income distribution of the origin region is di¤erent than that in the region of
destination.
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can change. In the collective choice mechanism of our model, the income
gap among jurisdictional median voters characterizes the dimension of
inter-jurisdictional conict of interest.
A number of cases are possible. Inter-jurisdictional mobility can lead
to either a lower5 or a higher6 income disparity among jurisdictional
median voters. Moreover, mobility can lead to jurisdictional median
voters that are simultaneously richer7 or poorer8 relative to the national
average income.
In our model, public spending can be interpreted either as the pro-
vision of a public or publicly provided good. Some authors use a similar
set-up to model a simple welfare system. In Razin, Sadka and Benjarong
(2011), for example, the government levies a proportional income tax,
with the revenues redistributed equally to all citizens, regardless of their
contribution to the nances of the system. In this view, government
spending may capture outlays on public services such as health, sickness
compensation, disability benets and the provision of other welfare ben-
ets. Following Razin, Sadka and Benjarongs (2011) view, our model
can also be used to study the relation between internal migration and
public spending for the welfare state.
5This may happen when unskilled workers, who live in a poorer district and earn
an income below that of the local median voter, migrate, and vote in a richer district
where they still earn a salary below that of the jurisdictional median voter. This
appears to have been the case, for example, in the massive migration of unskilled
workers from the South to the North of Italy during the fties and sixties.
For a historical perspective of the role of migration in regional income convergence
in Sweden, see Enoa et al. (2014). The Russian case has been recently analyzed by
Guriev and Vakulenko (2015) and Vakulenko (2014). Instead, for the German case
see Monras (2015).
6This is the case of the migration of skilled workers from a poorer to a richer
region. Borozan (2015) found empirical evidence of regional divergence in Croatia
due to internal migration.
7This is the case, for example, of the brain-drain that has characterized the mi-
gration from the South to the North in the last twenty years in Italy. Di Cintio and
Grassi (2013) found empirical evidence that a large number of skilled workers from
the poorer Italian regions who just received their University degree move to richer
regions to increase their income. Usually, before migrating, their incomes are lower
than the local median income. Once they migrate, they earn a wage above that of
the median voter of the destination region. As a result, the brain-drain from a poorer
to a richer region results in regional median voters that are simultaneously richer.
8This case may happen when voters who are richer than the jurisdictional median
voter move to a district where they become poorer than the local median voter. Note
that Davies andWiners (2011) empirical evidence provides a di¤erent example. They
show that the US immigration restrictions that came into e¤ect in 1968 for more than
two decades reduced Canadian emigration. This, in turn, may have contributed to
increasing both economic inequality within provinces and the size of government in
Canada.
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Our ndings suggest that public spending depends not only on whether
internal migration leads to either convergence or divergence in median
voters incomes and demands for public provision. It also depends on
the relative magnitude of these changes. Full convergence, for instance,
leads to higher (lower) supply when the increase in the demand of the
median voter who wants less provision dominates (is dominated by) the
decrease in the demand of the median voter who wants more provision.
As a result, median voters income convergence may lead to either a
higher or a lower public good supply.
We also study the relation between migration and the e¢ ciency of
public spending. We nd that e¢ ciency may not be achieved when
median incomes are equal to the regional average incomes, as regional
averages may be di¤erent from the national average income.
1.1 Related literature
As we have already mentioned, most existing literature deals mostly
with the case of external migration, which can be either welfare-driven
or a¤ect the welfare state of the destination (Gaston and Rajaguru,
2013) and where the decision makers are, usually, either the national
median voter or the jurisdictional governments in a Nash equilibrium
set-up (Dolmas and Hu¤man, 2004; Cohen and Razin, 2008; Razin and
Wahba, 2011 and 2012; Razin et al., 2011; Hansen, 2003; Armenter and
Ortega, 2010 and 2011 and many others). Day and Winer (2012) study
the internal and scally-driven migration in Canada within an empirical
framework. However, the question of how internal migration a¤ects the
policy making of the federal government still remains undeveloped.
Our model is also di¤erent from Tiebouts (1956) analysis. Tiebout
describes a model of community formation on the basis of given tax-
public goods combinations whereas ours is a model of bargaining about
the size of government spending among the jurisdictions. Furthermore,
the case where voters migrate in order to endogenously inuence gov-
ernment taxing and spending at the centralized level does not seem to
be an empirically relevant question.
Furthermore, we have used a cooperative approach to study policy
formation. Institutional cooperation is one of the main achievements
of modern democracies. Cooperation brings institutional credibility,9
9Cooperation implies the existence of a credible commitment of not cheating be-
tween jurisdictional median voters. In the current model, the commitment is credible
as we use a one shot game with one level of government, where policy makers nego-
tiate under the threat that the status quo, which implies no public good provision,
holds in the case of disagreement. In order to introduce cheating behaviors in the
model, one could either introduce new assumptions or relax some existing ones. For
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public consent and is a guarantee against any form of discrimination
and coercion.10 This justies the use of the cooperative Nash bargaining
approach to model policy formation.11
Meltzer and Richard (1981) linked the size of government spending
to the preferences of the national median voter. However, their ap-
proach cannot explain government policy in a multi-jurisdictional econ-
omy where locally elected representatives form a central government and
policies are determined through political bargaining (Giuranno, 2009).
We extend Meltzer and Richard (1981) to the case of internal migra-
tion in a multi-district economy. Following Giuranno (2009), we note
that Meltzer and Richards logic applies to a median voter in a sin-
gle jurisdiction. However, governments are composed of representatives
of electoral districts. Meltzer and Richards centralized median voter
approach cannot explain public policy in a multi-jurisdictional context
where locally elected representatives form a central government and poli-
cies are determined through bargaining.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section denes the
benchmark model. Section three discusses the relation between inter-
regional migration and majority voting outcome. Sections four, ve and
six present the results. Section seven develops a generalization of the
model to n districts. Section eight discusses some examples of the real
world present in the economic literature and nine concludes. The ap-
pendix contains derivations and proofs.12
example, cheating may arise in a scal federalism set-up with two or more tiers of
government or in a model that allows for either a repeated game or alternative voting
behaviors. This could lead to potentially interesting new insights, which may be the
subject of future research.
10Typically, non-cooperative institutional behaviors raise voices for institutional
reforms and may lead to the limit case of the break of a nation (Bolton and Roland,
1997), which goes beyond the purposes of this paper.
11Furthermore, Stokman and Thomson (2004), Thomson et al. (2006), Schneider
et al. (2006) and Hertz and Leu¤en (2010) found empirical evidence that supports
the choice of cooperative bargaining models for predicting policy outcomes inside
a multi-jurisdiction polity as the European Union. They suggest that cooperative
negotiations, which usually take place in informal meetings, provide a more accurate
forecast than legislative non-cooperative bargaining models, which consider more
explicitly the decision-making procedures in the legislature.
12Preliminary versions of this paper appeared in the following working paper series:
Giuranno, M. G., and Biswas, R., "Internal migration and public policy," POLIS
Working Papers 183, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS and
"Inter-jurisdictional migration and the size of government", MPRA Paper 42604.
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2 The economic framework without migration
Consider two jurisdictions, or regions, comprising a state.13 In juris-
diction 1 there are N1 people and in jurisdiction 2 N2 people, with
N1 + N2 = N and N normalized to one. We assume that a pivotal
voter always exists in the two jurisdictions. There are two goods in this
economy, a public or publicly provided good g and a private good y,
which can be thought of as individual income or initial endowment. We
denote by superscript h a generic individual. The central government
provides the public good uniformly across regions and levies a propor-
tional income-tax t, bounded by 0  t  1, on individual income yh in
order to nance the provision of g. We assume, for simplicity, that the
unit cost of g is one. Therefore, the government budget constraint can
be written as
ty = g, (1)
where y =
NX
h=1
yh=N is the average income of the whole economy.
Each citizen h has the same quasi-linear preferences over private
consumption, (1  t) yh, and publicly provided goods g. We can now
write the policy preferences of a citizen h as follows,
uh = (1  t) yh +H (g) = (y   g) y
h
y
+H (g) , (2)
where H (g) is the public spending benet function, with H 0 (g) > 0 and
H 00 (g) < 0.
In what follows, we analyze the e¢ cient policy outcome, the regional
rst-best policy under majority voting and nally, the legislature equi-
librium policy. Then, we study how a change in the distribution of
the electorate, due to inter-regional relocations or migration, a¤ects the
legislature equilibrium policy.
2.1 The e¢ cient policy outcome
In order to study the e¢ cient supply of the public good, ge, we maximize
the following welfare function:14
max
ge
NX
h=1
uh. (3)
13Here, we focus on the territorial dimension of the model. Alternatively, we can
think about two distinct ethnic, religious, income or other kinds of groups.
14As in Besley and Coate (2003), we assume that the endowments of the median
voters and of all the taxpayers are large enough to meet their tax obligations.
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The e¢ cient supply, ge, satises the familiar Samuelsonian condition,
H 0 (ge) =
X
yh
y
, (4)
which leads to the following simple equation
H 0 (ge) = 1. (5)
Equation (5) states that, in equilibrium, the marginal benet is equal to
the marginal cost.
2.2 The regional rst best under majority voting
Individual preferences are concave in policy, implying that every citi-
zen has a unique preferred policy that satises the following rst order
condition
H 0
 
gh

=
yh
y
. (6)
We assume that voters vote sincerely. Under majority rule, the voter
with median income is decisive. Furthermore, income is the only dimen-
sion of heterogeneity among citizens. Therefore, voters with incomes
below (above) that of the median voter prefer a higher (lower) level of
public spending on public goods.
The distribution of income di¤ers between the two jurisdictions. We
denote by yi, with i = 1; 2, the income of the median voter of region i
and, to simplify the exposition, assume that median voter 1 is not poorer
than median voter 2, y1  y2.15
The regional median voters form the centralized legislature, which
has to determine the size of public spending. Once the legislature de-
cides the size of g, the government budget constraint is automatically
determined by equation (1).16 Accordingly, the tax paid by median voter
i is tyi =
yi
y
g, with i = 1; 2. Thus, we write the utility function of median
voter i as follows,
ui = yi   yi
y
g +H (g) , with i = 1; 2. (7)
15In most cases, when this condition is violated there are symmetric situations,
which do not add new insights to the nal results. The cases where relaxing this
assumption lead to new and unpredictable results are addressed in section 5.
16The model could also be extended by introducing a di¤erent tax-rate for the two
jurisdictions so that the legislature can bargain over g, t1 and t2. In this case, budget
constraint would be g = N1t1y1 +N2t2y2, where y1 and y2 are the mean income of
jurisdiction 1 and jurisdiction 2 respectively.
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Policy is chosen by bargaining by the jurisdictional median voters in
the centralized legislature. Before looking at the bargaining solution, we
rst consider the rst best policy outcome for a regional median voter,
which is the unique solution to the following equation:
H 0
 
gDi

=
yi
y
, with i = 1; 2. (8)
Solution (8) states that the rst best for the median voter of region i is
the amount gDi that equates her private marginal benet to her private
marginal cost. Median voter i prefers a lower public expenditure when
her private marginal cost increases; that is, when @gDi =@
yi
y
< 0. This in
turn, implies that she would like a higher provision when either the mean
income increases or her private income declines because this reduces her
marginal cost.
Equation (8) nds the rst best national policy that a regional me-
dian voter would choose if she were a non-benevolent dictator at the
national level. If we compare equations (8) and (5), we can conclude
that the rst best for a regional median voter equals the e¢ cient supply
when the regional median and the national mean incomes are the same.
Otherwise, we obtain over provision when yi < y and under provision
when yi > y.
In the next section we describe how the regional median voters ne-
gotiate over policy in the national legislature.
2.3 The legislature bargaining equilibrium
In this section we will analyze the public policy outcome when deci-
sions are made directly by the jurisdictional median voters in the central
legislature. Here, median voters form a government and choose policy
through negotiation.17
We assume that if no agreement is reached, the government will not
be able to implement any public good, i.e., g = 0. Therefore, the utility
each representative obtains in the event of disagreement is udi = yi,
with i = 1; 2. That is, everybody consumes entirely his or her private
income.18 In order to reach an agreement, both median voters must
have positive net gains from implementing g. In formula, it must be
ui   udi  0, which implies  yiy g +H (g)  0.
17Note that we assume that voters vote sincerely when they elect the regional
representatives. Relaxing this assumption would be an interesting extension of this
paper, which we leave for future research.
18For a Nash bargaining situation where, in case of disagreement, policy is chosen
by the jurisdictional governments see Giuranno (2010).
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We denote the net gain from reaching an agreement of median voter
i with the symbol i, such that
i = ui   udi =  
yi
y
g +H (g) . (9)
The net gain from reaching an agreement is equal to the net private
gain minus the net private cost and represents the private net benet if
an agreement is reached on g. It is easy to see that the net gain from
cooperating on the provision of g is smaller for the richer median voter;
that is,
1  2. (10)
Median voters have the same net gains when they have the same income
yi and, hence, the same marginal cost
yi
y
.
Note that the marginal gain from bargaining is equal to the marginal
utility, here denoted as Mui; i.e.:
@i
@g
=  yi
y
+H 0 (g) =Mui. (11)
Representatives choose the government size g by bargaining. We
solve the bargaining problem by maximizing the following Nash bar-
gaining product:
max
g
(12) . (12)
The rst order condition is:
 y1
y
+H 0 (g)
 y1
y
g +H (g)
+
 y2
y
+H 0 (g)
 y2
y
g +H (g)
= 0. (13)
Since the two denominators must be positive, it turns out thatMu1 < 0
and Mu2 > 0 because the marginal cost is higher for median voter 1.
This shows that the bargaining equilibrium is a compromise between
median votersmost preferred policies; that is, in equilibrium, median
voter 1 would like a smaller provision of g and median voter 2 would like
more public consumption.
Furthermore, equation (13) can be easily rewritten in the form of the
sum of the elasticities of the net gains:
 y1
y
+H 0 (g)
 y1
y
g +H (g)

=g
+
 y2
y
+H 0 (g)
 y2
y
g +H (g)

=g
= 0. (14)
In order to see that, consider that the ratio
 yi
y
+H 0 (g)
 yi
y
g +H (g)

=g
, with i = 1; 2, (15)
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can be interpreted as the elasticity, with respect to g, of the net gain
from bargaining for median voter i. The elasticity measures the percent
change in gain from reaching an agreement relative to public spending.
It is easy to verify that, as yi
y
increases, the ratio (15) declines.19 This
means that a median voter becomes more rigid in the negotiation as she
becomes richer relative to the mean. Therefore, she will be less willing
to reach an agreement over g.
3 Regional median voters and inter-regional migra-
tion
What happens to the three equilibrium conditions (5), (8) and (13) when
the inter and intra-regional distribution of voters changes?20
A simple way to think about this issue is to consider the case of
inter-regional relocation or migration, which alters the composition of
the electorate without altering the total population. An individual who
relocates, and acquires the right to vote in the region where he or she
ends up, causes a change in the median voters of the two regions, as both
regional income distributions change. What matters is who becomes the
regional median voter after a perturbation in the electorate has taken
place. Actually, from equilibrium conditions (8) and (13), it is evident
that what really matters is the income of the new regional median voters
and the average income or, simply, their ratio yi
y
, with i = 1; 2. For this
reason, we denote by i =
yi
y
the "decisive" ratio between the income of
median voter i and the mean income of the whole economy.21
Following Razin et al. (2002), we solve the model by assuming a
continuous relation between the level of inter-regional migration or re-
location, m, and the parameter , which determines a change in the
regional median voters. The level of migration m may have several in-
terpretations. Razin et al. (2002) consider m either as an exogenous
binding quota or simply the number of migrants. We can simply think
about m as the number of migrants who move from region 1 to region 2,
or vice versa, where they acquire voting rights. Specically, when m = 0
the electorate does not change as no one moves between jurisdictions. As
m increases, the median voters of the two regions change; i.e.: @i
@m
Q 0,
19To see this, one has to consider that gH 0 (g)   H (g) < 0, as proved in Chiang
(1984, pp. 192-3).
20Note the electorate changes for many reasons such as, migration, inter-regional
relocation, aging (Sørensen, 2013) and so on.
21Note that changes in median-to-mean income ratios within and across jurisdic-
tions could be due to internal as well as external migration, or to other reasons
unrelated to migration.
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with i = 1; 2. The sign of @i
@m
depends on the ranking in both regions of
the income of the individuals who migrate.
Therefore, as in Dolmas and Hu¤man (2004), for a given value of
m, we need to conjecture the inter- and intra-regional distributions of
income. To summarize, when individuals migrate between regions and
acquire the right to vote in the region of destination, the following four
conceivable analytical cases arise:
1) 01 (m) 0 and 02 (m)  0;
2) 01 (m) 0 and 02 (m)  0;
3) 01 (m) 0 and 02 (m)  0;
4) 01 (m) 0 and 02 (m)  0.
According to equation (5), the e¢ cient supply implies no changes in
public policy when the regional composition of the electorate changes.
The reason is that neither the aggregate marginal cost nor the aggregate
marginal benet is inuenced by internal migration ows. Instead, both
the equilibrium condition (8) representing the regional median voters
rst best and the bargaining equilibrium (13) are a¤ected substantially.
Now, according to equation (8), if a small increase in m leads to a
richer (poorer) median voter in region i relative to the mean, the rst
best policy outcome for median voter i results in a lower (higher) g, as
suggested by Meltzer and Richard (1981).
We now study the inuence on centralized public spending when
there is a change in the electorate in the four conceivable cases.
4 Public spending under inter-regional migration
So far, we have argued that, in a world where income is the only element
of heterogeneity among citizens, changes in the composition of jurisdic-
tional electorates modies the distribution of income inside jurisdictions
leading to the election of di¤erent jurisdictional median voters. This,
in turn, implies that the redistributive conict between regions assumes
di¤erent intensities, which depend on whether the new regional pivotal
voters have either a lower or higher median-mean income ratio, i.
The following Lemma provides the key to solving the comparative
statics for the four conceivable cases.
Lemma 1 An increase in m leads to a larger public sector when the
following relation holds
dg
dm
> 0 when 
0
1 (m)
21
+
02 (m)
22
6 0 (16)
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and to a smaller public sector otherwise.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that the relation between inter-regional migration
and the size of the public sector depends on the sign of expression
01 (m)
21
+
02 (m)
22

, (17)
which is a function of the marginal change in the median votersincome
ratio 0i (m) due to migration and net gain i, with i = 1; 2. Obvi-
ously, we obtain dg=dm = 0 when 01 (m) = 
0
2 (m) = 0. Of course,
government size declines when 
0
1(m)
21
+
02(m)
22
> 0.
In order to understand the implications of Lemma 1 it is necessary
to study the four conceivable cases separately. We start from the two
simpler cases in which both median voters have become richer relatively
to the mean income voter and the opposite case in which they have
become relatively poorer.
We nd that an increase in m that leads to richer regional median
voters relative to the national average causes a decrease in the size of g.
Conversely, an increase in m that leads to poorer regional median voters
relative to the national average causes an increase in the size of g. In
formulas,22
dg
dm
 0 when 01 (m)  0 and 02 (m)  0 (18)
and
dg
dm
 0 when 01 (m)  0 and 02 (m)  0. (19)
Conditions (18) and (19) consider two cases where the change in
the electorate does not worsen the conict of interest between regional
median voters. In the rst case, an increase in the number of individuals
who move from one region to the other causes the election of relatively
richer regional median voters who are both more rigid with respect to
public spending. Therefore, they will certainly agree to reduce public
good provision. In the second case, both regional median voters are
poorer relative to the mean income. Therefore, they will agree to increase
redistributive public spending and have a larger public sector.23
22The proof is a straightforward application of Lemma 1.
23These results show that when there is no substantial conict of interest between
median voters the classical Meltzer and Richard (1981) result is replicated in a multi-
jurisdiction economy. However, only when the national median voters relative income
moves in the same direction as the jurisdictional median votersrelative incomes, both
Meltzer and Richards approach and our approach lead to the same policy prediction.
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Now, we turn to the cases of inter-regional convergence and diver-
gence where the impact of internal migration on national decision making
is not trivial.
4.1 Migration and inter-regional convergence
What happens when migration either mitigates or worsens inter-regional
redistributive conicts? We answer this question in the following two
Propositions. Specically, Proposition 1 refers to case 3 (convergence)
of section 3, while Proposition 2 refers to case 4 (divergence).
Proposition 1 An increase in m such that 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0
leads to the the following comparative statics results:
dg
dm
> 0 if j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j , (20)
dg
dm
Q 0 if j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j . (21)
Besides, for the residual limit cases that have not been treated above, the
following comparative statics results apply:
dg
dm
< 0 if 01 (m) = 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0, (22)
dg
dm
> 0 if 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) = 0. (23)
The proof is based on Lemma 1. When 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0,
the two ratios in (17) take the following signs: 
0
1(m)
21
< 0 and 
0
2(m)
22
> 0.
Therefore, given that relation (10) is always satised, as we assumed y1 >
y2, expression (17) is certainly negative when j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j. On
the contrary, the sign of expression (17) is ambiguous when j01 (m)j <
j02 (m)j. Furthermore, cases (22) and (23) are straightforward applica-
tions of Lemma 1.
In the case under consideration, the incomes of the median voters of
the two regions converge as median voter 1, the richer one by assumption,
becomes poorer with respect to the mean and median voter 2 becomes
relatively richer. In this situation, median voter 1 would like to increase
the size of g because her marginal cost is now lower. But, median voter
2 has a conict of interest. On the one hand she would like to increase
g as she can benet from redistributive public spending. On the other
hand, her marginal cost is now higher and this reduces redistribution in
her favour.
13
Case (20) in the above Proposition states that if the marginal change
in  is weakly greater for the richer median voter 1 , j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j,
then g increases. A bigger change in the gamma for median voter imeans
a bigger change in her marginal cost. Therefore, as the marginal cost of
the richer median voter declines, her gain from cooperating 1 increases
and she becomes more willing to agree on a larger provision of g. On the
contrary, as the marginal cost of the poorer median voter increases, her
gain from cooperation 2 declines and she becomes less willing to agree
on a larger g. Since, the change in the marginal cost is more relevant
for the region with the highest median income, the interest of the richer
median voter is dominant in the renegotiation. This, in turn, leads to
an increase in the size of government spending.
Case (21) states that if the marginal change in  is bigger for the
poorer median voter 2, j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j, then the change in govern-
ment spending is ambiguous. In order to understand the ambiguity, we
recall that according to the equilibrium condition (13), median voter 2
always wants more public good provision than median voter 1, in equi-
librium. When median voter 2 is relatively richer, she has to balance her
willingness to have more public spending with a higher marginal cost,
which decreases her net gain from public goods provision 2. Corollary
1 shows that the ambiguity disappears under full income convergence.
Case (22) can be seen as a limit situation of case (21). It states
that government size declines, dg

dm
< 0, if income convergence induced
by migration does not a¤ect the richer median voter, 01 (m) = 0 and
02 (m) > 0. Thus, the ambiguity of case (21) is solved in case (22).
Similarly, case (23) can be read as a limit situation of case (20).
As expected, it states that government size unambiguously increases,
dg
dm
> 0, if income convergence does not a¤ect the poorer median voter,
01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) = 0.
The above Proposition has an interesting Corollary. We noticed that
when 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0, median voters income disparity
declines. Now, what happens when they actually equalize? We nd
the full convergence between median votersincomes leads to opposite
results depending on whether we are in situation (20) or (21), as stated
in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider the case where 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0 in
which an increase in m leads to median voters income equalization,
y1 = y2, then government size increases when j01 (m)j > j02 (m)j and
declines when j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j.
The proof of the Corollary is straightforward after considering that
median votersincome equalization also leads to median votersnet gains
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equalization, 1 = 2, in Lemma 1.
According to case (20), government size increases when inter-regional
income equalization occurs mainly because the median voter of the richer
region is a poorer one. In this case, inter-regional net gains equalization
is mainly driven by a lower marginal cost for the richer median voter.
On the contrary, case (21) is not ambiguous anymore as dg

dm
is strictly
negative when y1 = y2. Thus, government size declines when inter-
regional convergence occurs mainly because the median voter of the
poorer region is a richer one. In this case, inter-regional net gains from
reaching an agreement tend to equalize too, but this equalization is
mainly driven by a higher marginal cost for the poorer median voter.
Therefore, since the impact on the marginal cost of the richer median
voter is less relevant, it will be mutually convenient to agree on a lower
g.
For completeness, we also note that when j01 (m)j = j02 (m)j and
y1 = y2 then
dg
dm
= 0.
4.2 Migration and inter-regional divergence
Now, we turn to the next case in which the gap between median voters
incomes and marginal costs widens. This is illustrated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 An increase in m such that 01 (m) > 0 and 
0
2 (m) < 0
leads to the the following comparative statics results:
dg
dm
< 0 if j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j , (24)
dg
dm
Q 0 if j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j . (25)
Besides, for the residual limit cases that have not been treated above, the
following comparative statics results apply:
dg
dm
> 0 if 01 (m) = 0 and 
0
2 (m) < 0, (26)
dg
dm
< 0 if 01 (m) > 0 and 
0
2 (m) = 0, (27)
The proof is based on Lemma 1. When 01 (m) > 0 and 
0
2 (m) < 0,
the two ratios in (17) take the following signs: 
0
1(m)
21
> 0 and 
0
2(m)
22
< 0.
Therefore, given that relation (10) is always satised, expression (17) is
positive when j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j. On the contrary, the sign of expression
(17) is ambiguous when j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j. Besides, cases (26) and (27)
are straightforward applications of Lemma 1.
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In Proposition 2, the incomes of the median voters of the two regions
diverge as median voter 1 becomes richer with respect to the mean and
median voter 2 becomes relatively poorer. In this situation, median
voter 1 would like to decrease the size of g because her marginal cost is
now higher. Instead, median voter 2 would like to increase g as she can
benet from increased redistributive public spending at a lower marginal
cost. In addition, the poorer median voter has a higher net gain from
cooperating. While, the net gain is lower for median voter 1, which
restricts the set of possible agreements.
The situation where the change in the marginal cost is weakly greater
for the richer median voter, case (24) in the Proposition, leads unam-
biguously to a smaller public sector. The richer median voter sees her
gains to cooperate becoming smaller and uses this to gain bargaining
power in the negotiation, which allows her to impose her preference on
public policy.
In case (25), where the change in the marginal cost is greater for
the poorer median voter, the inuence on policy outcome is ambiguous.
However, as case (26) suggests, we can establish the sign of the compar-
ative statics when 01 (m) = 0, which unambiguously leads to
dg
dm
> 0.
Thus, if the income of the richer median voters does not change, median
voter 2 will be able to renegotiate an increase in g. Therefore, in case
(25), in order to obtain a decrease in g, the interest of the richer median
voter in reducing the implementation of g must be strong enough to win
the interest of the poorer median voter in increasing it. Furthermore,
as expected, condition (27) states that the size of g decreases when the
income of the poorer median voter does not change.
5 What happens when migration modies which
median voter is the richest?
In order to simplify both the analysis and the exposition, we have as-
sumed that the median voter of jurisdiction 1 is always richer than the
median voter of jurisdiction 2; i.e.: y1  y2. We now relax this assump-
tion as this leads to an additional intriguing situation in which case 3)
ows into case 4); that is, when the income ranking of the jurisdictional
median voters gets destroyed, the incomes of the median voters rst
converge to the same level and then cross over and diverge.
The following Proposition presents the case where median voters
incomes reverse their initial ranking.
Proposition 3 Consider an initial situation where y1  y2. An in-
crease in m such that 01 (m) < 0 and 
0
2 (m) > 0 that reverses the rank-
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ing of the jurisdictional median voters incomes leads to the following
comparative statics results:
dg
dm
< 0 if j01 (m)j  j02 (m)j , (28)
dg
dm
Q 0 if j01 (m)j > j02 (m)j . (29)
Besides, for the residual limit cases that have not been treated above,
(22) and (23) apply.
The proof of the above Proposition follows from Lemma 1, after con-
sidering that by1  by2 implies b1  b2, where byi and bi denote respectively
the post migration median voters income and net gain, with i = 1; 2.
When migration reverses the ranking of jurisdictional median in-
comes, we obtain a new income divergence case. Here, the initial size of
government is certainly restored when the incomes of the median voters
are symmetrically reversed; that is, when y1 = by2 > y2 = by1. In this
case, the median voter of jurisdiction 1 (jurisdiction 2), who wanted less
(more) public spending in the equilibrium before migration, wants more
(fewer) public goods after migration.
Furthermore, the above Proposition states that (22) and (23) ap-
ply for the two limit cases. Moreover, there is no contradiction among
(22) and (23) in Proposition 1 and (26) and (27) in Proposition 2 as
median voter 1 is now poorer then median voter 2. Similarly, there is
no contradiction between (28) and (24) and between (29) and (25) by
symmetry.
6 Inter-regional migration and e¢ ciency
In this section, we present a Proposition that compares the bargaining
outcome with the e¢ cient supply of the public good. In order to do this,
we distinguish the following three analytical cases:
case 1) y  y1  y2;
case 2) y1  y2  y;
case 3) y1  y  y2.
In case 1) both median voters have incomes below the average in-
come of the whole economy. This is a standard assumption based on
empirical evidence (see Meltzer and Richard 1981, 1983 and others).
However, since we have a model with two regions and two median vot-
ers, this assumption could be violated in some cases. For this reason, we
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also consider case 2), which could apply to some developing countries
situations and, for completeness, case 3), which could apply to countries
where median voter income is above the national income in the urban
districts and below the average national income in the rural areas.
Proposition 4 The bargaining outcome is e¢ cient when regional me-
dian votersincomes converge towards the mean income of the economy;
i.e., when 1 = 2 = 1. On the contrary, when y  y1  y2 (y1  y2  y)
government spending is over- (under-) provided and when y1  y  y2
government spending can be either over or under-provided.
The proof is in the Appendix.
When, in each region individually, the regional median choice is equal
to the regional average, the median choice in each region might not be
equal to the average for the country, which is required for both median
voters to choose the e¢ cient supply. Under the latter, there is no conict
of interest between regions as y = y1 = y2 and median votersnet gain
from cooperating is identical, 1 = 2.
It is interesting to link Proposition 4 to Corollary 1. Accordingly,
when migration leads to inter-regional convergence, where condition
1 = 2 = 1 is also satised, then e¢ ciency may imply either an in-
crease in government spending when j01 (m)j > j02 (m)j, or a decrease
when j01 (m)j < j02 (m)j.
Now, what happens when we move away from the situation where
y = y1 = y2? Clearly, the bargaining outcome leads to di¤erent results
for the three cases under consideration where median voters do not have
the same net gain from cooperating anymore. In the rst case, where
y  y1  y2, the net gains from cooperating increase for both median
voters and government spending is over-provided, as suggested by (19).
Similarly, in the second case, where y1  y2  y, the net gains decline
for both median voters and government spending is under-provided, as
suggested by (18). Instead, in the third case, where y1  y  y2, the
net gains of the two median voters diverge; i.e., 1 < 2. Therefore, the
nal outcome is ambiguous.
7 A generalization
In this section we extend the model to the case of more than two juris-
dictions. Thus, we denote by j a generic jurisdiction, with j = 1; ::::; J
and J > 2. Furthermore, we keep the total population normalized to
one; i.e.,
JX
j=1
Nj = 1. Government budget constraint is given by equation
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(1), since it does not depend on the number of local jurisdictions. For
the same reason, the e¢ cient policy outcome satises equation (5).
Now, we study the legislature equilibrium policy with J jurisdictions.
The Nash bargaining solution implies that the net gains from reaching
an agreement on the size of g must be weakly positive for all regional
median voters; that is,
j = uj   udj =  
yj
y
g +H (g)  0, 8 j = 1; :::; J . (30)
The equilibrium policy maximizes the following Nash bargaining prod-
uct of the net gains of the J representatives:
max
g
JY
j=1
j, with j = 1; :::; J . (31)
The rst order condition is
JX
j=1
 yj
y
+H 0 (g)
 yj
y
g +H (g)
= 0. (32)
As we already know, migration may change the median income of
both the origin and destination districts and the average income of the
economy. Furthermore, when a citizen migrates in an economy with
more than two jurisdictions, we must also consider that any variation
in the average income impacts on the median/mean income ratios of
jurisdictions not directly a¤ected by the migratory movement.
After using equilibrium condition (32), we can rewrite Lemma (1) in
a more general form.
Lemma 2 In an economy with J > 2 jurisdictions, an increase in m
leads to a larger public sector when the following relation holds
dg
dm
> 0 when
JX
j=1
0j (m)
2j
 0, with j = 1; :::; J , (33)
and to a smaller public sector otherwise.
The proof is in the Appendix.
Clearly, even with J > 2 government size increases (decreases) when
inter-regional migration leads to regional median voters that are simul-
taneously poorer (richer) relative to the mean income of the whole econ-
omy; That is,
dg
dm
> 0 when 0j (m)  0, 8 j = 1; :::; J , (34)
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and
dg
dm
 0 when 0j (m)  0, 8 j = 1; :::; J . (35)
Proposition 5 provides the comparative statics solutions for the con-
icting cases.
Proposition 5 In an economy with J > 2 jurisdictions, when an indi-
vidual migrates from jurisdiction j to j, such that y0j 6= 0 and y0  0, the
following comparative statics results apply:
dg
dm
> 0 when 1
y
 
y0j
2j
+
y0
j
2j
!
6 0, with j = 1; :::; J . (36)
Similarly, when an individual migrates from jurisdiction j to j, such that
y0j  0 and y0 6= 0, the following comparative statics results apply:
dg
dm
> 0 when   y
0
y2
JX
j=1
yj
2j
6 0, with j = 1; :::; J . (37)
Furthermore, when an individual migrates from jurisdiction j to j, such
that y0j 6= 0 and y0 6= 0, the following comparative statics results apply:
dg
dm
> 0 when 1
y2
JX
j=1
y0jy   y0yj
2j
6 0, with j = 1; :::; J . (38)
The proof is a straightforward application of Lemma 2.
In order to deal with the conicting cases, it is useful to study sepa-
rately the e¤ects of migration on the marginal change of regional median
incomes and on the average income of the whole economy, as reported
in conditions (36) and (37).
Specically, condition (36) describes what happens when an individ-
ual migrates from region j to region j and the impact on the average
income is negligible (y0  0) because either his income does not change
signicantly, or its marginal impact on the average income of a large pop-
ulation is zero. In that situation, the equilibrium policy is driven only
by the change in the median incomes of the region of origin and that of
destination. It is easy to verify that Propositions (1), (2) and (3) apply
in the cases, respectively, of median income convergence, divergence or
income reversing between regions j and j.
Now, assume that migration ows lead to a change only in the average
income, without signicantly a¤ecting regional median incomes, so that
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we can set y0j  0 into (33) for any j. According to (37), government
size increases (decreases) when the average income increases (decreases);
that is, dg=dm > 0 when y0  0 and dg=dm < 0 when y0 < 0.
Furthermore, according to (38), when migration ows lead to sig-
nicant variations in both the average income and the regional median
votersincome, the sign of the comparative statics is ambiguous, as it
depends on the specic magnitudes of these changes. However, it is clear
that when the average income increases (decreases), government size also
increases (decreases) when either all regional median voters are poorer
(richer), or the impact on the regional median incomes is su¢ ciently
stronger in the regions where median incomes decline (increase).
Finally, the following Proposition generalizes Proposition (4) to the
case with J > 2 jurisdictions.
Proposition 6 In an economy with J > 2 jurisdictions, the bargaining
outcome is e¢ cient when regional median voters incomes converge to-
wards the mean income of the economy; i.e., when j = 1, 8 j = 1; :::; J .
The proof is in the Appendix.
Therefore, even in the model with more than two jurisdictions, gov-
ernment spending equalizes the e¢ cient policy outcome represented by
equation (5) when median votersincomes converge towards the mean
income of the economy in all jurisdictions. However, the relation be-
tween government size and e¢ ciency is ambiguous, as it depends on the
magnitude of the changes in median/mean incomes.
8 Discussion
The present work may stimulate further empirical research and provide
a theoretical foundation to the already existing one. Furthermore, the
model can be tested by laboratory experiments that have the advantage
of isolating the e¤ect of mobility on public policy from other e¤ects.
The aim of this section is to discuss some real-world examples, pre-
sented in economic literature, where internal migration is likely to have
increased or decreased public spending and e¢ ciency.
First, we focus on the relation between interregional migration and
e¢ ciency that, according to Proposition 6, depends on income conver-
gence. Pissarides and McMasters (1990) seminal work demonstrate
the existence of a direct relation between internal migration and inter-
regional convergence relying on the working of the labour market. Ac-
cording to traditional economic theory, regions with high unemployment
rates tend to experience falling relative wages. This, in turn, generates
two e¤ects. On one hand it increases the demand for labour. On the
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other hand, it encourages workers in poor regions, especially the unem-
ployed, to look for jobs in regions with higher relative wages and lower
unemployment rates. In the absence of impediments to mobility, work-
ers are encouraged to relocate until regional salaries converge towards
the same level. This, in turn, may satisfy the necessary condition for
e¢ ciency stated in Proposition 6. Therefore, by matching Pissarides
and McMasters relation and our Proposition 6, we can conclude that
a relation between internal migration and e¢ ciency in public spend-
ing may exist through the functioning of the labor market. A question
that emerges concerns the time needed for full interregional convergence.
Based on UK data, Pissarides and McMaster (1990) found empirical ev-
idence that full convergence, through internal migration, is a rather slow
process. As a result, internal migration may improve e¢ ciency in the
short run, while achieving full e¢ ciency is a long-term issue.
Recent economic literature (Chevalier et al. 2018; Alesina et al,
2018) is increasingly focusing on the relation between migration and
redistribution through public expenditure. Chevalier et al. (2018), Falck
(2012) and Decressing (1994), for instance, focused on the German case
where interregional migration has played a prominent role since the post
World War II. Following a massive relocation of German population
after World War II, internal migration had profound e¤ects on the size
of public spending for the welfare state in West Germany (Chevalier
et al., 2018). At that time, inter-regional migration ows in Germany
involved around eight million Germans. Chevalier et al. (2018) used this
historical episode as a natural experiment by exploiting the fact that
internal migrants had full voting rights. The relocation of considerably
poorer individuals from East to West Germany increased the demand
for redistribution in West Germany local constituencies. This, in turn,
increased the demand for public spending for the welfare state in West
Germany. Since East and West Germany became politically divided at
that time and the elected representatives in local West German districts
become relatively poorer voters after immigration from the East, the
size of the public sector increased. The historical episode described by
Chevalier et al. (2018) was followed by several migratory shocks in
Germany, whose impact on public spending deserves further empirical
analysis.24
24According to Decressin (1994), the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 interrupted
the migration from Eastern to Western Germany that then become a North-South
migration with the direction depending on the rise and fall of heavy industries such
as coal, shipbuilding and metallurgy that were concentrated mainly in the North of
West Germany. The following dismantling of the Berlin Wall caused a new wave
of migratory ows from East to West Germany that, according to Parikh and Van
Leuvensteijn (2003), leaded to interregional wage convergence. Furthermore, De-
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Paci et al. (2007) conducted an empirical analysis focusing on Cen-
tral European countries and the Baltic Region. They found that, start-
ing in the mid-nineties, internal migrations became highly concentrated
among skilled and better educated workers. Such migratory phenomena
created a push towards a greater divergence of inter-regional incomes.
Therefore, according to our analysis, we should expect less e¢ ciency in
public spending in those countries.25
In India, which is politically a quasi-federal state, internal migration
happens quite often because the income di¤erential between the rich and
the poor states can be rather substantial there (Sharma, 2017; Bhagat,
2010). Several hypotheses can be empirically tested. When, for instance,
a poor citizen moves from a lower-income state like Bihar to a higher
income state, say Maharashtra, the median income of both the states
may decline, if the worker was from a relatively high-income bracket
in his home state but he is getting a low wage (still higher than his
original wage in his home state). If the local median voters are decisive,
they will ask for a higher size of the government in a setting like India,
where private health and education are way beyond the reach of the
poor, sometimes even the middle class. However, if the converse is true,
that is, both the states become relatively richer, they will end up asking
for lower government size because the quality of government health and
education is viewed by the richer classes with suspicion in India.
Furthermore, the median income of Indian jurisdictions might move
di¤erently. If the migrants ends up adding to the productivity of the
state where they move for work, the median incomes of the receiving
states increase, whereas the incomes of the departing states decline.
There, an immediate conict will ensue, which depends on the force
of the conicting demand of important social goods like health and ed-
ucation.
9 Final remarks
A rational theory that sheds new light on the relation between internal
migration and public policy is conspicuously absent in economic litera-
ture, where most theoretical works deal mainly with the relation between
public spending and external migration.
This paper investigates under what conditions internal migration
cressin (1994) found a signicant procyclical e¤ect of internal migratory ows, which
therefore seem to be less e¤ective in reducing interregional wage di¤erences.
25Furthermore, in order to understand the changes in the size of government spend-
ing, depending on internal migration, one should consider the magnitude of the
changes on regional median/mean incomes in each single country, which could be
the base for new empirical investigations.
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may enhance e¢ ciency and the implications for public spending.
Clearly, migration leads to e¢ ciency from a social point of view when
median regional incomes converge towards the average income of the
overall economy. However, the e¤ect on government spending is not
univocal. Government size increases when the electoral perturbation is
more relevant for the region with the richest median voter and decreases
otherwise.
As a result, the consequences on public policy of migration ows
depend on the way migration shapes both inter and intra-regional re-
distributive conicts and their magnitude. In general, in order to make
policy predictions, it is not enough to know whether migration ows lead
to either convergence or divergence in the incomes of the regional piv-
otal voters, one must also know the magnitude of the marginal change
in their relative incomes.
The results of our analysis cannot be found with the classical country-
wide median voter approach. Clearly, no prediction is possible within
the country-wide median voter approach when internal migration leads
to inter-regional convergence, divergence or when the income ranking of
regional median voters reverses, as inter-jurisdictional conicting inter-
ests would not emerge in that approach.
A future development of our model could be along Salmons line
(2015), where Salmon addresses the issues of mobility manipulation to
shape the electorate.26
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Denote by F the rst order condition (13),
F =
 1 (m) +H 0 (g)
 1 (m) g +H (g)
+
 2 (m) +H 0 (g)
 2 (m) g +H (g)
= 0. (39)
We want to study dg

dm
  Fm
Fg
. It is straightforward to verify that the
second order condition is negative, Fg < 0, while the numerator is
Fm =
 01 (m)1 + 01 (m) g @1@g
21
+
 02 (m)2 + 02 (m) g @2@g
22
. (40)
After rearranging we get
Fm = (gH
0 (g) H (g))

01 (m)
21
+
02 (m)
22

. (41)
26See, also, Mingat and Salmon (1988).
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Here, (gH 0 (g) H (g)) is negative because the marginal benet is smaller
than the average benet, i.e. H 0 (g) < H (g) =g.27 We conclude that Fm
is positive when

01(m)
21
+
02(m)
22

is negative. This proves the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4. In order to prove the proposition, we rst
show that the bargaining solution leads to the e¢ cient solution when
1 = 2 = 1. In this case, the bargaining rst order condition (13)
becomes 2 1+H
0(g)
 g+H(g) = 0. This is satised when H
0 (g) = 1, as in equation
(5). Second, consider the case y  y1  y2. The e¢ ciency condition (5)
does not change when the distribution of the electorate changes between
regions. On the contrary, condition (19) shows that the provision of
g increases as the median mean income ratios decline for both median
voters. Third, consider the case y1  y  y2. The impact on g of
moving away from the situation 1 = 2 = 1 is explained by Proposition
2. Therefore g may either increase or decrease.
Proof of Lemma 2. Denote by V the rst order condition (32),
V =
JX
j=1
 j (m) +H 0 (g)
 j (m) g +H (g)
= 0. (42)
We want to study dg

dm
  Vm
Vg
. It is straightforward to verify that the
second order condition is negative, Vg < 0, while the numerator is
Vm =
JX
j=1
 0j (m)j + 0j (m) g @j@g
2j
. (43)
After rearranging we obtain
Vm = (gH
0 (g) H (g))
JX
j=1
0j (m)
2j
(44)
where, we already know that (gH 0 (g) H (g)) is negative. We conclude
that Vm is positive when
JX
j=1
0j(m)
2j
is negative.
Proof of Proposition 6. In order to prove the proposition, we need
to show that the bargaining solution with J > 2 jurisdictions leads to
the e¢ cient solution when j = 1 for all j = 1; :::; J . In this case, the
bargaining rst order condition (32) becomes J  1+H
0(g)
 g+H(g) = 0, which is
satised when H 0 (g) = 1, as in equation (5).
27For a standard proof see Chiang (1984, pp. 192-3).
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